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Green grabbingA convergence of factors creates a worrisome contemporary pattern of resource dispossession of local
populations in developing countries. Growing market demand for commodities, states’ interest in
expanding their fiscally fertile territories, and environmental conservation pressures have promoted
resource frontiers, where locals all too frequently lose access to land, water and livelihoods. To add
momentum and legitimize outsiders’ agendas, such locations are sometimes framed as ‘‘last frontiers”
– the final places of possibility. While various forms of resource ‘‘grabbing” have gained increased atten-
tion, we argue that a crucial dimension of frontier dynamics – neglect and its role in facilitating dispos-
session – warrants further study as it tends to be overlooked. Drawing on the frontiers and political
ecology literature, this article analyzes how neglect by state authorities, markets, and environmental
organizations paves the way for dispossession in those landscapes. We compare two cases: the
Matopiba soy frontier in the savannas of Brazil’s Cerrado and the Chin Hills of western Myanmar. Our
results show how neglect is critical to imaginatively frame regions as ‘‘empty” places of possibility,
excluding local actors economically from development and politically from governance initiatives. We
argue that neglect not only precedes but is an enduring feature of resource frontiers, and identify four
consecutive phases: (I) pre-frontier abandonment, (II) selective support to outsiders, (III) overlooked
harms to communities, and (IV) socially exclusive sustainability agendas. As environmental concerns gain
increasing global salience, Phase I sometimes leaps to Phase IV as international actors pounce to control
what they regard as ‘‘last frontiers” for conservation. We conclude that external actors’ inaction enables
local communities’ dispossession as much as their actions. This raises critical policy and scholarly ques-
tions about actors’ responsibility and accountability, not only for harms done but also for systematically
failing to heed local actors’ aspirations and needs.
 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).and environmental governance pressures also reshape landscapes’‘‘The first time the state made itself present in our land was to evict
us from it.” – Local community leader from Matopiba, Brazil1
1. Introduction
Few places on the globe remain unaffected by current land
transformation pressures often driven from afar (Cons &
Eilenberg, 2019). Not only states seek to turn every piece of terri-
tory into ‘‘fully governed, fiscally fertile” zones (Scott, 2009: 10),
transnational drivers such as market demands for commoditiesphysical, social and institutional realities (Bastos Lima & Persson,
2020; Clapp, Isakson, & Visser, 2017). Frontier expansion in devel-
oping countries disassembles pre-existing territorial orders in
response to those pressures and reassembles them as resource
extraction sites, with considerable social and ecological conse-
quences (Cons & Eilenberg, 2019; McCarthy & Cramb, 2009;
Moore, 2000; Woodworth, 2017).
That process includes material transformations and imaginative
ones — that is, the mental reframing of certain regions as lands of
possibility, leading to a rearrangement of resource access and con-
trol patterns, usually resulting in local dispossession (Li, 2014a;
Lund, 2011; Tsing, 2003). As if to accentuate their value or attrac-
tiveness, some places are framed as ‘‘last” frontiers, the final
remaining rooms of opportunity (Barney, 2009). While originally
often thought of as places of physical conquering and ecological
transformation (see Moore, 2000), ‘‘last frontiers” have also come
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about vanishing ecosystems to be (urgently) preserved (see
Bryant, Nielsen, & Tangley, 1997). Yet, critical scholars have shown
that both industrial agriculture and nature conservation have often
served as rationales for capital accumulation by dispossession
(Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012;
Harvey, 2004).
The notion of last frontiers is not new but has recently gained
resurgent currency as a narrative to attract attention and invest-
ments. Wood (2006) discusses how the term was used in the
1910–1940s to draw farmers to Canada’s boreal woodlands, then
regarded as that country’s final remaining room for agricultural
enterprise. Now, there is growing interest in resource frontiers and
how they work (see Cons & Eilenberg, 2019; Rasmussen & Lund,
2018), as well as in issues of land acquisitions (Borras et al., 2020;
Li, 2014a), tourism-related dispossession (Neef, 2021) and ‘‘green
grabbing,” understood as the appropriation of resources for conser-
vation (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Fairhead et al., 2012).
We argue that there is, however, an often-overlooked dimen-
sion of frontier dynamics: neglect, critical to creating the condi-
tions for local impoverishment and dispossession. Some authors
acknowledge state neglect as an element of resource dispossession
(Vijayabaskar & Menon, 2018) or as the twin of elite capture (Hall
& Kepe, 2017). Yet, neglect seldom receives much attention as a
conceptual entry point for frontier studies. Perhaps local communi-
ties are too often idyllically imagined as being – by default – better
off without the state or any ‘‘outsiders,” who should just let them
be (see Esteva & Escobar, 2017). That can be a reasonable impres-
sion from many instances of dispossession, but it might suggest a
predisposition for total self-reliance that may not always represent
local peoples’ views.
In practice, local communities often resent not being heard and
lacking support to meet their needs (Russo Lopes, Bastos Lima, &
Reis, 2021; Vijayabaskar & Menon, 2018). They are left out of what
they frequently see as benefits of modern life (e.g., healthcare,
housing, transportation), governance processes and decision mak-
ing about the landscapes they live in (Bastos Lima & Persson, 2020;
Li, 2014b). If frontiers are associated with individuals’ abilities to
‘‘make their own fortunes through their own efforts” (Li, 2014b:
150), and if a resource frontier is nothing but a specific re-
assemblage of various imaginative, material, and political ele-
ments, it might be asked why local people have not been able to
develop their fortunes. It begs the question of what has sapped
or stunted their capacities, and how that might make them prone
to becoming victims of dispossession.
Our research objective is to innovatively delve into the shadow
dimensions of frontier assemblages, using neglect as a conceptual
entry point to explore how outside actors’ (strategic) inaction – as
much as their actions – shapes frontier outcomes. To untangle the
‘‘processes atwork thatprecede, constituteand followtheassembling
of resource frontiers as epicentres of extraction and production”
(Cons & Eilenberg, 2019: 9), we contrast two cases, in Brazil and
Myanmar. Despite their differences, both countries have experienced
growing outside interest and involvement with places regarded as
last frontiers in their territories. We investigate how this particular
framing is used in the current reassembling of two ‘‘remote” regions
(Matopiba in Brazil and Chin State in Myanmar) and show how the
lens of neglect may help explain recent and ongoing dynamics.2. Conceptualizing neglect in resource frontiers
2.1. Resource frontiers as imagined and material places for expansion
Frontiers can be understood as places where existing ecologies
and social orders are purposefully dissolved to give way to new2
ones, usually geared towards resource commodification and
export-oriented extraction (Rasmussen & Lund, 2018; Tsing,
2003). They are assemblages anchored both in imaginative and
material constructions (Cons & Eilenberg, 2019). On the one hand,
there is an enframing effort to regard certain spaces as places of
possibility – through discourses, appealing narratives of resource-
fulness, as well as maps and other devices that can make invest-
ments thinkable (Li, 2014a). On the other hand, the reordering of
space also relies on concrete struggles and takeover of resources,
legal changes in ownership or use rights, and often the ‘‘botanical
colonization” of landscapes alongside the displacement – or exter-
mination – of its inhabitants (Scott, 2009: 12). Frontiers thus result
in permanently transformed relations between landscapes, people,
animals, and plants (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011).
Often, the state itself will engender such transformations as a
way to mark – or, rather, to produce – sovereignty over people
and territory (Lund, 2011). Scott (2009) discusses how the state
is driven to enclose outlying regions, which often are geographi-
cally challenging to access. He conceptualizes them as ‘‘zones of
refuge” to where people went to escape authorities’ grip in the
past. Then, there was at some point ‘‘the realization that these
[hitherto] neglected and seemingly useless territories [. . .] were
suddenly of great value to the econom[y]” (Scott, 2009: 11). As
Scott puts it,
‘‘[s]een from the state center, this enclosure movement is, in
part, an effort to integrate and monetize the people, land and
resources of the periphery so that they become, to use the
French term, rentable – auditable contributors to the gross
national product and to foreign exchange.” (Scott, 2009: 4)Nevertheless, states should not be reified as isolated units of
analysis (Moore, 2000). World-systems scholars identify frontiers
as ‘‘peripheral” regions where socio-ecological transformations
take place to meet the desires of a global politico-economic ‘‘core”
(Arrighi, 2009; Wallerstein, 1974). As Moore (2000) argues, fron-
tiers are not simply about incorporating peripheral regions but
doing so in a particular fashion, usually to produce commodities
at the lowest echelon of the global economy. Therefore, rather than
only a geographical place, they are also a ‘‘space of flows” — low-
value commodity flows to economic and political centers (Moore,
2000).
International conservation actors likewise take advantage of
historical structural inequalities within the world-system
(McAfee, 2012). As a global pressure for environmental conserva-
tion intensifies (see Buscher & Fletcher, 2018), we must broaden
the classical definition of commodity frontiers as places of physical
extraction (see Moore, 2000). Instead, we use the term resource
frontiers in a wider sense to also include ‘‘natural capital”, that is,
nature regarded as an economic resource (e.g., for carbon markets,
payments for conservation, commodified tourism) even when it is
not physically extracted from the site (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015).
Either way, frontiers continue to be places ‘‘where further expan-
sion is possible,” where uncommodified land, nature and labor
remains that can be successfully appropriated (Moore, 2000, p.
412), physically or not, into the dominant economic system.
Regionalist and structural expressions of frontiers, therefore, go
together (Woodworth, 2017). Historical neglect often precedes the
establishment of resource frontiers. Colonialism destabilized many
local communities and made others into ‘‘fringe societies”, left in
‘‘underserved areas” with fewer resources or limited access to
communications, transport, and economic exchange (Scott, 2009).
Such abandonment by economic and political centers typically
underscores the dialectical relationship they will establish as
metropoles vis-à-vis ‘‘remote” frontiers (Stoler & Cooper, 1997).
As Cons and Eilenberg (2019) argue drawing on Li (2014a), it is
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frontier demands imaginative and material anchors, and much
seems to be anchored on previous neglect.
Neglect thus paves the way for the characteristic view of fron-
tiers as places of ‘‘not yet” (Tsing, 2003: 5001), which is only made
possible by disregarding what there is. Broadly seen, neglected
people in such ‘‘fringe” places could be described as the ‘‘residual
inclusion of subjects within a world that is indifferent to their pres-
ence within it” (Taylor, 2018: 37). That situation, in turn, is often
used to legitimize interventions in the name of bringing ‘‘develop-
ment” to frontier communities (Russo Lopes et al., 2021). Neglect
thus becomes an instrumental – but still undertheorized – aspect
of capital accumulation and economic (and political) expansion.
2.2. Neglect: An overlooked concept in the frontiers literature
It might at first seem paradoxical to critique neglect in contexts
of resource frontiers, which after all are ‘‘zone[s] of destruction of
property systems, political structures, social relations, and life-
worlds to make way for new ways of resource extraction”
(Rasmussen & Lund, 2018: 389). The arrival of outsider presence
has usually come to signify the erasure of local communities and,
oftentimes, biophysical environments. Yet we argue that neglect
is not only a preliminary condition but also an enduring feature
of resource frontiers.
Neglect etymologically carries the connotation of ‘‘not being
read” or not being legible, from the Latin verb neg-legere (Taylor,
2018: 37). Using neglect as an analytical concept or lens therefore
requires thinking of who does not read who. In resource frontiers,
it is usually local communities that suffer exclusion, are trumped
on, and frequently feel neglected (Hall et al., 2011; Li, 2014b;
Russo Lopes et al., 2021). Theirs are the life-worlds destroyed in
resource frontiers, life-worlds that many – if not most – continu-
ally fail to read (see Rasmussen & Lund, 2018). The ‘‘powers of
exclusion” – and therefore also of inclusion – rest in turn with
those who either by force or economic means gain the right or
the capacity to dictate whose livelihoods are legitimate and whose
are not (Hall et al., 2011). Neglect, thus, is a lens from the vantage
point of local communities, usually the ones with the highest
stakes at resource frontiers. While acknowledging internal social
diversity, it is still possible to distinguish them from state forces,
outside investors, new colonists, and others.
Many communities may wish to be left to their own devices,
but that is not always the case. There is a strong self-reliance bias
in notions such as ‘‘the art of not being governed” (Scott, 2009) or
the understanding of local people as by default interested in being
left undisturbed (see Esteva & Escobar, 2017). Moreover, that bias
portrays developing country states in a hopelessly negative light,
as always necessarily maleficial in resource frontiers, in contrast
to Western states generally analyzed regarding their social con-
tract and public accountability.
We argue that no matter how much mistrust developing coun-
try states may have provoked, local populations who see them-
selves as part of imagined national communities (Anderson,
1983) are not always ready to abandon hope of some level of rela-
tionality. Taylor (2018: 6-7) suggests that,
‘‘[n]eglect is a profound experience of nonsovereignty, one that
locates the possibilities of one’s being in a world in the attenu-
ated attentions of another. Yet a low-grade, subtle optimism
underwrites neglect’s affective repertoire of loneliness, incom-
pletion, and diminishment.”Local communities may wish the state – or markets and private
investors for that matter – treated them differently, not necessarily
that they go away. Communities may expect support from out-3
siders and that state institutions live up to their (often legally
enshrined) public responsibilities. As Le Grand and New (2015)
discuss, what gets commonly portrayed as ‘‘paternalism” usually
involves realizing legitimate public duties and constitutional obli-
gations. Even Stuart Mill (1860), in his seminal On Liberty, defend-
ing individual autonomy, argued the state should make itself
present to prevent individuals from harming one another – a
securing presence that communities generally fail to find in
resource frontiers. Not all wish to be fully sovereign and autono-
mous, and to assume so from the start would be to further deny
a voice to marginalized actors.3. Cases, research approach and methods
As ‘‘last frontier” framings hasten the global rush for resources,
it is key to understand their constitutive economic, political, and
imaginative elements – their assemblages (Cons & Eilenberg,
2019). While the literature often treats those issues in terms of
regional dynamics in Asia, Africa or Latin America (e.g., Cons &
Eilenberg, 2019; Borras, Franco, Gómez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012; Hall
et al., 2011), we opt for an innovative cross-continental compar-
ison to illustrate commonalities across the globe — despite regional
particularities that may exist. To inquire into the role of neglect in
two very different settings, we take Matopiba in Brazil and Chin
State in Myanmar as case studies. Both involve struggles for
resource control and have been dubbed ‘‘last frontiers” in their
respective contexts.
Brazil’s Matopiba frontier has experienced staggering territorial
acquisition for agribusiness expansion, notably for soy cultivation.
This dynamic has increasingly threatened both the Cerrado ecosys-
tem – the world’s most biodiverse savanna – and numerous tradi-
tional populations (Russo Lopes et al., 2021; Strassburg et al.,
2017). It is a frontier that has experienced intense pressure from
colonist farmers. More recently, it has also seen substantive
engagement from international environmental NGOs (Bastos
Lima & Persson, 2020). Matopiba hence offers the case of a mature
‘‘last frontier,” where we appraise how multiple forms of neglect
have unfolded during the past decades.
The assemblage in Myanmar’s Chin State is less mature. Frontier
dynamics in this region emerged comparatively recently, with
Myanmar’s political transition since 2010. International sanctions
were lifted, and the country opened to investors, tourists and
development actors enticed by narratives of Myanmar as Asia’s
final frontier (e.g., Parker, 2016; Yueh, 2013). In 2012, the Chin
National Front – an armed ethnic group operating in Chin State
since 1988 – entered ceasefire negotiations with Myanmar’s gov-
ernment, which then paved the way for peace talks and imaginar-
ies of Chin State as Myanmar’s very own last frontier (Fleming,
2014; Project Maje, 2012).
Our analysis draws on a review of country-specific literature as
well as extensive fieldwork in Brazil and Myanmar. We use pri-
mary sources (e.g., national laws and policy documents) as well
as literature, including scientific articles, news pieces, and civil
society organization reports. The fieldwork took place between
2016 and 2019. The first author comes from one of the Matopiba
states and thus builds on significant baseline knowledge. He draws
on one field campaign in Brazil for a research project about
agribusiness expansion and attendance at multiple supply-chain
sustainability events in Europe. The second author spent seven
months (distributed over three fieldwork periods) in Kalay and
the northern Chin Hills, for a four-year research project on
livelihood-land interlinkages in Myanmar’s uplands (Kmoch,
2020). In both cases, we conducted a combination of key-
informant interviews, focus-group discussions, and participant
observations, as well as three household surveys in the Chin case.
Fig. 1. Brazil’s Cerrado biome and the Matopiba frontier, encompassing areas of
Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí and Bahia states. Large-scale agriculture areas (usually
soy) are shown vis-a-vis pasturelands and natural vegetation (Mapbiomas 2020).
Adapted from Russo Lopes et al., 2021.
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literature to draw inferences and triangulate multiple sources of
evidence.
Interviews about the Brazilian frontier were conducted in Por-
tuguese and included stakeholders from each of the four Matopiba
states as well as from Brasília and São Paulo, important decision-
making centers from where Matopiba is usually regarded as a fron-
tier. Interviewees included public officials at the national and state
level, agribusiness representatives, local communities (including
indigenous people), and civil society organizations. The project in
Myanmar was realized in close collaboration with staff from a local
NGO that served as a gatekeeper and whose introductions helped
to build trust among research participants from local communities
and state agencies’ staff. Interviews with Myanmar stakeholders
were conducted in English, Burmese or Tedim Chin, and engaged
Chin residents, regional-level agricultural authorities and NGO
staff in Yangon and Kalay. All research activities in Myanmar were
aided by field assistants from the study area (who also helped
interpreting interviews), which further aided in trust-building with
local respondents.
4. Neglect and dispossession in ‘‘last frontiers
4.1. Matopiba: Brazil’s ‘‘last agricultural frontier”
4.1.1. A new name for an old place
‘‘Matopiba” is but a recent invention, an ‘‘inscription device” (Li,
2014a) put forth by the Brazilian government and agribusiness
amalgamating the hinterlands of four states into one coherent, alas
attractive, agricultural frontier. Formalized in 2015 through the
Matopiba Agricultural Development Plan and later with the cre-
ation of a federal Matopiba Development Agency, this new imagi-
nary region conjoins 337 municipalities of the states of Maranhão,
Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia – hence its name.2 The whole region
falls within a land of shrub, grass and woodlands known to conser-
vationists as the Cerrado, a biome rich in endemic species and river
headwaters (Strassburg et al., 2017). To locals, it is traditionally
known for countless locales that give them local identities. The
region as such had no specific name, except that such hinterlands
in Brazil’s interior have been generally known as the sertão, the
broad backcountry away from the coast where people of different
and often mixed ancestries eventually came to see themselves as ser-
tanejos (Moraes, 2000).
Unlike many African or Asian ‘‘remote” areas, which frequently
border on other countries, Matopiba is placed more or less in the
middle of Brazil (Fig. 1). It is far from the country’s limits, and
the region’s local communities have not sought to break away.
Matopiba is casually comparable to the Australian Outback, not
really at risk of secession, yet regarded as a rugged frontier of ‘‘civ-
ilization.”3 That interior of Brazil – including what is now called
Matopiba – has long served as a ‘‘zone of refuge” (Scott, 2009: 22),
where indigenous peoples and escaped African slaves settled to
avoid state-sanctioned violence (Moraes, 2000). Thousands of such
Afro-Brazilian communities (quilombos) chronically suffer from
invisibilization amidst other grievances (Sax & Angelo, 2020). Many
communities of mixed ancestry have also emerged around particular
livelihoods, such as the Fecho de Pasto pastoralist communities or the2 For years, it had been previously called ‘‘Mapitoba”, in a different sequencing of
the states’ initials by outsiders who did not realize toba is a vulgar slang word in the
region. A change to ‘‘Matopiba” was therefore in order before formalization by the
federal government (Interviews).
3 It is worth noting, however, that in 2007 there was an attempt by politicians from
the Piauí municipalities that currently integrate Matopiba to create a new state,
Gurgueia, pointing out precisely the neglect the region had historically experienced.
The initiative was formally proposed in the Senate (PDL 55/2007) but failed to garner
sufficient support (see Claudino, 2007).
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babassu (Attalea speciosa) nutcrackers, a traditional occupation that
secures the livelihood of over 300,000 women across the region
(Russo Lopes et al., 2021). Vibrant local cultures around solidarity
economies have emerged (see Sabourin, 2014), though a self-
regard of forsakenness has also made itself present.
4.1.2. Pre-frontier neglect: Matopiba before its name
The neglected nature of this part of Brazil – by the state, private
investors, urban civil society and anything commonly associated
with development – has long been notorious; it has been the sub-
ject of songs and much documentation (Goodman, 1976; Silva,
2010). Until the early 1990s, municipalities in this region had ‘‘very
low” Human Development Index (HDI) indicators, revealing little
formal economic activity, high levels of child mortality, poor access
to healthcare, below-average life expectancy, and high illiteracy
rates (Pereira, Porcionato, & Castro, 2018).
Matopiba’s gross economic indicators have risen over the past
decades, partly because of agribusiness revenues, but they hide
growing income inequality and social exclusion (Buzato, Cardoso,
Favareto, Magalhães, Garcia-Drigo, & Souza, 2018; Favareto,
2019; Garrett & Rausch, 2016). Those aggregated indexes mask
longstanding problems, as the testimonial of a local community
member illustrates:
‘‘We need schools, healthcare units for us. . . something better. [The
children have] school classes under trees – a wind blows and all the
papers fly away. They then ask the parents to build the schools.
Next, the mayor will ask us to pay for the teachers as well. He is
the one with the money and who should do it.”Collective or individual land titling for locals has long been
scant, along with little if any agricultural technical assistance or
rural extension services. Smallholders and even indigenous com-
munities in Matopiba wish it were otherwise and lament being his-
torically overlooked by the state.
4
are
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obsolete, abandoned, almost without any government struc-
ture. Our votes only have value during the elections, otherwise
it’s always the same thing — we are forgotten.” (Smallholder
farmer)44.1.3. From zone of refuge to resource frontier: ‘‘The gauchos are
arriving”
In rather classical fashion, the Matopiba frontier emerged
(much ahead of its name) in the 1980s when governments realized
that this neglected, seemingly useless region could be of economic
value. From the 1970s, Brazil expanded commercial soy planting at
great speed and quickly became a major exporter (Oliveira &
Hecht, 2016). Public universities and state agronomic research
agencies, initially with Japanese foreign aid, developed new crop
varieties and chemical-input packages for soy to thrive on the
acidic soils of Brazil’s Cerrado, and a new frontier emerged
(Wesz, 2016). In time, soy crops would cover more than 35 million
hectares in the country.
Soy expansion began as a growing number of farmers from Bra-
zil’s temperate South Region sought their fortunes at the frontier,
at first in the central states of Goiás and Mato Grosso. Broadly nick-
named gauchos, they formed a migration wave northward between
the 1970s-1990s and have been the main human element of fron-
tiering across Brazil’s interior (Mondardo, 2010). Reaching the
other end of the Cerrado was mostly a matter of time — what
would happen with full force in the 2000s (Oliveira & Hecht, 2016).
Seen either from the perspective of southern Brazilian migrants
or from the country’s economic centers in São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro, Matopiba lands are remote, the farthest stretches of Cer-
rado – its last frontier. For those who venture there, ‘‘remoteness”
becomes a way of being (Harms et al., 2014). Indeed, a view of gau-
chos as intrepid and somewhat ‘‘nomadic” frontiersmen is a main-
stay in Brazilian social thought (Freyre, 1968). Local accounts by
such soy farmers effectively do convey enthusiasm, pride, and
sometimes an almost triumphalist tone:
‘‘We are migrant producers; we have a history here, since the ear-
lier ones who came in the 1970s and 1980s to grow rice and then
brought soy from the South.”
‘‘When we can no longer produce here in Bahia, we will go [further
north] to Maranhão, to Pará. . .We will only stop once we reach the
sea.”
Even from the perspective of state capitals and regional metro-
poles (São Luís in Maranhão, Teresina in Piauí, and Salvador in Bahia),
the faraway Matopiba municipalities are the backcountry of their
respective states, where soy migrants have therefore been welcomed
for ‘‘at least bringing something.” As a senior state-level official in
Matopiba puts it, ‘‘soy has arrived in a region that produced nothing.”
Tocantins is a special case in that the whole state is part of Matopiba,
likely because it is the constituency of the members of parliament
and agriculture minister who launched ‘‘Matopiba” as an enframing
device to attract agribusiness investments (see Senado, 2016).
While neglecting locals, governments and private investors
have embraced and spurred soy expansion by colonists – mostly
southern Brazilians, but to a lesser extent also US American, Euro-
pean, or Asian immigrants in Matopiba (Mondardo, 2010;
Ofstehage, 2016). State support, which finally reaches this region,
primarily occurs through the creation of cargo transport infrastruc-
ture, public research funding into agricultural commodities, and
tax breaks (Pereira et al., 2018). In a testimonial to the primacyVoting in Brazil is mandatory, and the numerous votes of vulnerable rural people
historically sought after as easy to buy when elections are near.
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of private capital for the constitution of Matopiba, a senior state-
level official related:
‘‘Soy and others are crops that have come by themselves – without
us, the state government, pulling it — because it comes with money
and private-sector impulse. [That part of our state] was long for-
gotten by the government until 40, 30 years ago. It was void of hos-
pitals etc. Then the gauchos came, already with some structure to
them. So it was an extremely poor region, then some money finally
came to it. We are now becoming a great logistical hub.”
Once Matopiba became formalized at the federal level in 2015, a
great deal of political support to agribusiness investments also
gained ground with the marketing of this ‘‘last frontier” as a final
bout of opportunity (see Agência Senado, 2016). The invisibiliza-
tion of the previous land uses and land users is key for this promo-
tion, alongside the neo-Malthusian justification of having to feed a
growing global population (Borlaug, 2002; see De Schutter, 2017).
As a migrant soy grower in Matopiba proclaimed, ‘‘we have trans-
formed unproductive lands into a factory of food for the world, into
a protein factory.” Neglected locals, on the other hand, clearly have
grievances:
‘‘The government’s project is much more to look at soy than to
assist the families that have been in the region for a long time.”
(Local smallholder)
‘‘[Smallholder] family agriculture is not part of this Matopiba plan.
Traditional communities do not participate. They speak of our state
as a ‘productive corridor’ as if there were no people here.” (Local
rural worker)4.1.4. Dispossession and transformation in Matopiba
Soy’s expansion into Matopiba has been far from seamless.
There is a fair deal of what Scott (2009: 12) characterizes as ‘‘inter-
nal colonialism”, involving
‘‘the absorption, displacement and/or extermination of the pre-
vious inhabitants. It involve[s] a botanical colonization in which
the landscape [is] transformed – by deforestation, drainage, irri-
gation and levees – to accommodate crops, settlement patterns,
and systems of administration familiar to the state and to the
colonists.”
In the case of Matopiba, Brazilian ‘‘soy colonists” nevertheless
constitute only the bottom of an international grain supply chain.
As a senior state-level official in Matopiba fatefully puts it, ‘‘soy is
what the international market pays for.” Besides, together with soy
– or, more to the point, before soy – comes the speculative expec-
tation of land valorization, which has led to a frenzy of buying and
the ‘‘assetization” of Matopiba’s lands for financial gain by national
and international players (Frederico, 2019).
As soy estates employ very few people in their vast mechanized
fields, absorption of previous inhabitants is scant. On-farm job cre-
ation is minimal and usually goes to migrant skilled workers
(Favareto, 2019). Most communities have thus been vanishing
from the land, either bought out or forcibly evicted. It is not
uncommon for prospective agribusiness people to conjure counter-
feit land titles and take advantage of the prevalent land tenure
insecurity in which Matopiba’s communities have long been left
(Russo Lopes et al., 2021). Fake or seemingly authoritative ordinary
documents are then utilized as devices for the ‘‘legal disposses-
sion” of locals (see Pichler, 2015). Rural conflicts over land or water
access have been rampant (CPT, 2020). Violence is widespread, and
accountability is rare as the frontier typically operates as an extra-
legal space where the rule of law is partial and often selective
(Rasmussen & Lund, 2018).
5 See https://cerradostatement.fairr.org
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intense conflicts for land and water. Evicted workers, denied
rights. . . We have been attacked by those alleged owners. There
have been shootouts, rape threats. . . [and] we have never had
any legal hearings or assistance. [. . .] The Justice [system] favors
only one side.” (Local grassroots organization member)
Indigenous peoples with titled lands cannot be dispossessed,
but they too have felt the frontier’s dynamic as feelings of over-
looked harms and neglect are pervasive.
‘‘Some roads have been built for grain transportation, and the pres-
sure increases on us. We are concerned; waters, creeks and river-
heads have been decreasing. They consume a lot of water, with
large-scale irrigation. The bees no longer produce honey; and chil-
dren are also falling sick more easily, we believe partly because of
their aerial spraying [of pesticides]. There is no dialogue, and there
is no action from the State to address this problem.” (Local indige-
nous leader)
Matopiba has become a ‘‘riskscape” – as frontiers are usually
seen (Cons & Eilenberg, 2019: 11). Incoming agents, initially colo-
nists but increasingly venture capitalists, corporate investors and
absentee owners, indeed regard themselves as daring individuals
that face climatic, investment and even physical risks to advance
the agricultural frontier and ‘‘develop” the country (see Pereira
et al., 2018; Russo Lopes et al., 2021). However, this purported ‘‘de-
velopment” has been highly inequitable, leading some to instead
call it maldevelopment (Russo Lopes et al., 2021).
‘‘There is one side who has power and determines how things
should take place, and there is a side that suffers and cannot even
keep up. This celebrated development ends up improving one group
and massacring another.” (Local indigenous leader)
While a small agribusiness elite concentrates most wealth,
much of Matopiba is impoverished, with a growing number of dis-
possessed smallholders being forced to venture into the unac-
knowledged riskscapes of city slums (see also Favareto, 2019). As
a representative from a local civil society organization sums up,
‘‘[m]any families that have managed to resist and remain, even if in
a reduced titled part of their land, have not been able to stay in this
area. First, for being impacted, especially by agrochemicals in the
water and in the air. Second, financial [land] speculation. They
had as a historical reference free access to land, not as a commod-
ity. After soy, the land starts to be coveted. Thus, many families end
up preferring to negotiate the land for an amount they think it’s
good, but going away to the city slums, the money soon runs out,
and they find themselves without access to land or employment.”
To many indigenous and non-indigenous locals, the livelihood
changes brought about with frontierization have therefore come
to be perceived as worse than the previous abandonment, when
they at least had access to land, water, local natural resources,
and what most agree to have been a peaceful life, even if lacking
in services. As their social fabric disintegrates, they also become
more powerless (see Vervisch, Vlassenroot, & Braeckman, 2013).
Grassroots movements such as around a shared heritage of Afro-
Brazilian communities do resist and have been increasingly vocal,
yet their grievances are routinely neglected (CONAQ, 2018). As a
local indigenous elder testified, ‘‘we used to live in peace, and now
we are troubled. Each day that passes, bad things come. And they will
not be only for us, but for white people as well.”
4.1.5. A socially exclusive sustainability agenda for Matopiba
More recently, a new form of neglect has gained momentum in
Matopiba as vegetation clearing raises international concerns over
biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions (see Bastos Lima,6
Persson, & Meyfroidt, 2019; Green et al., 2019; Escobar et al.,
2020). Perhaps attempting to twist the ‘‘last frontier” signifier in
favor of urgent environmental conservation, scientists have rung
alarm bells about the vanishing Cerrado ecosystem (Strassburg
et al., 2017). In 2017, hundreds of civil society organizations
launched a Cerrado Manifesto requesting public and private con-
servation actions.5 However, broad sustainability calls have been
substantially narrowed as international environmental NGOs and
grain traders capture the agenda to focus (only) on conservation in
private estates and financial rewards exclusively to soy growers
(Bastos Lima & Persson, 2020).
Brazil’s environmental policy in Matopiba has largely been an
aide of frontier expansion (Eloy, Aubertin, Toni, Lúcio, &
Bosgiraud, 2016). Instead of creating public protected areas or
ensuring land tenure security for the region’s traditional communi-
ties, governments have selectively emphasized conservation
within private properties, requiring farms to keep a percentage of
their area as native vegetation (Lima, da Silva Junior, Rausch,
Gibbs, & Johann, 2019). In tandem, soy traders’ zero-
deforestation commitments have incentivized suppliers to have
green areas under their possession (see Zu Ermgassen, Ayre,
Godar, & Bastos Lima, 2020). As such, soy growers wishing to por-
tray themselves as ‘‘sustainable” have increasingly sought — and
grabbed — also communal vegetated areas as an asset, often hilly
or creekside areas unsuited to mechanized harvesting and which
had been initially spared but now are also coveted (Russo Lopes
et al., 2021).
As Cons and Eilenberg (2019: 12) warn, ‘‘frontierization must be
understood as a process of radically simplifying the meanings of a
space to, primarily, the things valued within it.” In Matopiba’s case,
those things are arable land suitable for soy and, increasingly,
water for irrigation and fenced-off native vegetation for commod-
ified conservation. As a migrant soy farmer enthusiastically put it,
‘‘we have protein to offer, and soon we will also sell carbon.”
Land rights, social equity issues, or longstanding local develop-
ment pleas from Matopiba communities have little place in the
mainstream sustainability agenda discussed for it (Bastos Lima &
Persson, 2020). For decades, various local civil society organiza-
tions have been calling for state and private-sector support in pro-
moting sustainable development that takes livelihoods and the
region’s native biodiversity into account (Sawyer & Lahsen,
2016). Such calls have existed since at least the 1992 Earth Summit
in Rio, but they have remained largely unheeded (Bastos Lima &
Persson, 2020). Traditional forms of ‘‘convivial conservation”
(Buscher & Fletcher, 2019) have been proposed for Matopiba but
are sidelined as the once ignored Cerrado was turned into an
appealing agricultural frontier. Harms were done, and the region’s
environmental conservation value brought onto the agenda in
response, yet local communities’ interests have remained
neglected throughout.4.2. Chin State: Tracing neglect in an emerging frontier
4.2.1. Chin State: Peripheral highlands at the Indo-Myanmar frontier
Chin State, bordering Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts and
the northeast Indian states Manipur and Mizoram, is one of Myan-
mar’s seven ethnic minority states (Fig. 2). These ‘‘remote” ethnic
states topographically frame the country’s central and southern
regions mostly inhabited by the Barma, Myanmar’s majority ethnic
group. Seen from the common Barma or international vantage
points, these latter regions constitute the country’s economic and
socio-political centre, while the culturally and economically
diverse ethnic minority states form its center’s relational periph-
Fig. 2. Chin State, bordering India and Bangladesh a), is an almost entirely
mountainous region, situated northwest of Myanmar’s central agricultural plain
and delta regions b). Own maps, based on data and images  Google Earth, SIO,
NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA, GEBCO, US Dept of State Geographers, Landsat/Copernicus,
TerraMetrics, GADM.
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relationships with the State of Myanmar, which have remained
politically unsettled since the end of British colonial rule in 1948.
Prior to British rule, people and land in present-day Chin State
were governed through hereditary chieftainship and clan arrange-
ments (Vumson, 1986). Colonial times saw missionaries introduce
Christian beliefs that have since been widely embraced in Chin
State. Intra-community social hierarchies changed little, however,
as the British administrators found the ‘‘barren and mountainous”
area ‘‘commercially uninspiring” and thus did not challenge the
chieftains’ local rule (Vumson, 1986: 137). Yet, it was under British
rule that the present-day border separating India and Myanmar
was established. Communities in the Chin Hills thus came to be
associated with Burma (now officially Myanmar) and therewith
subjects of successive post-colonial Burmese governments.
4.2.2. Pre-frontier neglect in the Chin Hills – Myanmar’s poorest region
Post-colonial times in Chin State can be read as a long phase of
pre-frontier neglect (Fleming, 2014). Burma’s ruling elites, despite
claiming territorial sovereignty over Chin State’s land and natural
resources, assumed little responsibility for the wellbeing of its
impoverished rural communities. On the contrary, the region’s res-
idents were subject to decades of more than just neglect. Unheard
by most, they experienced ‘‘pervasive human rights violations”
including forced labor, arbitrary taxation, torture and ‘‘intersecting
forms of State-sanctioned discrimination, based on their ethnicity
(Chin), religion (predominantly Christian), language (for most Chin,
Burmese is their second or third language), and socio-economic
status (the poorest in Burma)” (Fleming, 2014: 6).
Today, Chin State’s residents are the poorest people in the entire
country (Central Statistical Organisation, 2020). A population of
close to 480,000 inhabitants, they live in an almost entirely moun-
tainous area spanning 36,000 square kilometres (Department of
Population, 2015). The number of people with personal roots in
this region is much greater, however, as a large Chin diaspora
either left in search of education and economic opportunities
abroad or simply fled. ‘‘Our life in the village is very difficult”, related
an older Chin man, ‘‘but we would struggle even more without the
help of our daughter, who now lives in Malaysia and sends money
home.” Remittances have indeed become the largest income source
for some of the region’s rural communities, who otherwise rely on
subsistence-oriented swidden farming and homegarden crops
(Boutry, Allaverdian, Win, & Sone, 2018; Kmoch, Palm, Persson, &
Rudbeck Jepsen, 2018; Kmoch, Palm, Persson, & Jepsen, 2021).
Various additional indicators portray Chin State’s historic
neglect. Fuelwood is households’ primary energy source, and elec-
trification rates remain very low (Department of Population, 2015).
Most people lack access to basic communication amenities or
motorized transport, and a third of Chin’s inhabitants depend on
rudimentary drinking water sources (that is, rainwater or unpro-
tected lakes, rivers and streams). ‘‘Life is very difficult because it is
so hard to get water [. . .] and we struggle to go to [the local township
centre] Tedim and other places to which we need to go,” an elderly
Chin woman observed. ”Maybe we would be better off if we died
and went to heaven” she exclaimed while reflecting on the everyday
hardship she and her husband experienced, in consequence of
regionally deficient public services, lacking infrastructure invest-
ments, and her children’s economic migration.
4.2.3. Emergent frontier dynamics in Myanmar’s very own ‘‘last
frontier”
Unlike other frontiers in Southeast Asia, rural change in Chin
State has not (yet) been linked to expanding ‘‘boom crops” (i.e.,
fast-expanding agricultural cash-crops adopted to meet interna-
tional market demands) (Vicol, Pritchard, & Htay, 2018: 451). Nev-
ertheless, material interests in land and natural resources are rising7
as the region has become a place of opportunity in the imagination
of various stakeholders.
Chin State has been experiencing substantial construction work
on transport infrastructure, inter alia as part of India-ASEAN road
network developments (Technical Team of TRDSP Tedim, 2017).
In its more rural parts, bridges across the Manipur River and smal-
ler unpaved roads connecting some of the region’s many dispersed
villages have been upgraded through a cooperation between the
Ministry of Construction and Chin State’s government. The latter
has spent as much as 50 percent of its budget improving the
region’s road network (Soe, 2020). Although by and large wel-
comed by local communities, these infrastructure investments that
open the Chin frontier have not come free from harm to all. ‘‘Our
former house in the village had been built just five years ago”, said
a Chin resident, sitting at his new home’s building site, with all
his worldly possessions under the open sky. ‘‘Now we have to shift,
as the new road is being constructed across our land.”
Former cropland on the urban fringes of Kalay (a major regional
city just beyond the Chin Hills’ eastern flanks, gateway to the
State’s north, and with a majority Chin population) has been com-
modified and sold off. The expanding city, with its market ameni-
ties and public services, acts as a strong attractor for Chin State’s
rural households, as a new resident explained: ‘‘Most villagers
dream of moving to Kalay, as life is easier here, but the mountains
are where we have our Mithuns [Bos frontalis, a large domestic
bovine] and cows to raise.”
Kalay’s development has partly been spurred by its proximity to
the Moreh-Tamu border with India. Market access via this route
may open commercial opportunities for Chin State’s horticultural
producers, mirroring commercial activities in the Indian State of
Mizoram across the border (Singh, Ramakrishna, Verma, & Singh,
2013). This potential comes at a cost, however. The city’s flourish-
ing drug industry has been linked to its ‘‘property boom” (Marshall,
2016) and is noteworthy, as research on ‘‘narco-frontiers” has
shown that drug-sale profits may accelerate land accumulation
dynamics and ‘‘violent agrarian change” in historically marginal-
ized spaces (Ballvé, 2019: 11).
Developments further south in Chin State match, or even
exceed, those in the north. The construction of Lower Laivar
Dam, set to supply 50,000 residents of Falam township with water,
was completed in June 2020 (Myanmar News Agency, 2020).
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port (Surbung Airport, for USD 24.6 million) also opened (Carlisle,
2020; Khonumthung News, 2020). A first factory processing ele-
phant foot yam (for export markets in China) now operates in Min-
dat township and will purchase produce from 63 villages (DaNa
Facility, 2020). International tourism enterprises, once wary the
region was still too remote and ‘‘underdeveloped” for most foreign
visitors, now eye the Chin Hills as a promising destination for
adventure and cultural tour packages (Blennerhassett, 2020).
Finally, the State government has provided land to ten entrepre-
neurs who applied to build new hotels in the region in the 2016–
17 fiscal year (The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2016).
Chin State’s chief minister, in an interview with the Myanmar
Times, foregrounded community-based ecotourism as the regional
government’s ‘‘top [investment] priority”, and highlighted copper,
chromite and nickel mining as promising investment opportuni-
ties, while hoping for local farmers to abandon their traditional
swidden practices in favor of fruit and flower production (Su
Phyo Win, 2017). State and national-level authorities, in collabora-
tion with a UK-funded private sector development programme,
have held investment workshops, seminars and an investment
and product fair to showcase business and trade opportunities in
Chin State, such as in the region’s textile, agribusiness, tourism,
infrastructure and energy sectors (DaNa Facility, 2019; Su Phyo
Win, 2017). Under Myanmar’s new Investment Law, local and
international investors enjoy a seven-year tax exemption in the
country’s less developed regions, including Chin State (The
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2016). These efforts to attract
foreign direct investments have – as of yet – been little successful,
but this may change as new infrastructure improves Chin State’s
accessibility.
4.2.4. New risks and persistent neglect to rural peoples’ livelihood
security
Chin State may be a frontier in its infancy, one where frontier
dynamics are yet to unfold with full force. Anticipated develop-
ments may take longer to materialize due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic, but persistent neglect and new risks already permeate the
Chin frontier.
Since the ceasefire and given the unfurling frontier dynamics,
local expectations for improved service provision have been high
in Chin State (Middleton, Thabchumpon, Lian, & Pratomlek,
2017). ‘‘The most important thing that this region needs are schools,”
a Chin farmer noted. ‘‘Our children can only attend school to class
eight in the village, and even in Tedim it goes only up to class ten.”
Other grievances remain; for example, following local protests
the town of Hakha has been connected to the national electricity
grid, but water insecurity remains a major challenge for its resi-
dents (Middleton et al., 2017), let alone for Chin State’s numerous
rural inhabitants.
Many Chin farmers felt particularly neglected when a disaster
unfolded in 2015, as in the wake of Cyclone Komen households
received insufficient support to recover from the endured losses
of health, food, shelter, and productive assets (Desportes, 2019).
Northern Chin farmers’ persistent lack of access to locally desired
agro-industrial inputs (e.g., hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and pesti-
cides), targeted extension services, or tools and materials to estab-
lish basic irrigation systems – to address chronic poverty and food
insecurity – has likewise remained largely unaddressed (Kmoch,
2020). ‘‘We cannot use our paddy fields because there is no water to
irrigate our land,” said a northern Chin farmer, ‘‘and most of our
paddy fields were taken away by water [as Komen passed] but we
did not receive help from any NGO or the government.”
New risks to households’ livelihood security have arisen from
national-level changes in the legal framework governing land
rights, too. The 2018 amendment of the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin8
Lands Management Law of 2012 is a case in point (Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, 2018). In its latest version, this law facilitates
the appropriation of land that has been declared idle or vacant.
That, alongside growing interest in residential land near urban cen-
ters, seriously threatens local people with ‘‘legal dispossession”
(Pichler, 2015) and undermines customary land-tenure practices,
including swidden farming and communal land ownership (Aung
& Pretzsch, 2017; Kmoch et al., 2021; Boutry and Allaverdian,
2018). ‘‘Most people in this village manage their swidden land pri-
vately, they own the land, but it cannot be officially registered,” noted
a local extension worker reflecting on the farmers’ predicament.
Publicly voiced concern about these risks – the Chin Land
Affairs Network ‘‘urged for the law to be revoked, saying it would
ignite conflict in the area” – have remained unaddressed (Nyein,
2019). Moreover, the government has neglected to comprehen-
sively inform customary landowners about its recent law amend-
ments (Soe & Par, 2019). That, alongside failure to deliver
interventions that shelter resource-poor households against land
appropriation, matters not only vis-a-vis potential external invest-
ment interests. It also appears urgent as economic inequalities
among Chin households grow. Vicol et al. (2018: 458) for instance
characterize elephant foot yam as a ‘‘not so boom crop,” but
nonetheless note that its adoption has led to an accumulation of
better-quality land in the hands of wealthier Chin households.
Nickel mining is likewise no innocent affair, as dispossession
dynamics associated with the Mwetaung Nickel Mine show. Only
thanks to ‘‘grassroots mobilization” and a local ‘‘anti-
dispossession movement” – rather than State authorities, who
failed to act in support of ‘‘furious villagers insisting to get clear
answers” – did local communities maintain their customary con-
trol over farmland in the vicinity of what could have become a
22-hectare open-mine operation (Einzenberger, 2018: 15, 22).
4.2.5. Protected nature, neglected people in the Indo-Burma
biodiversity hotspot?
Unlike Brazil’s Cerrado, natural resources in Myanmar’s Chin
State are not subject to high-profile roundtables, zero-
deforestation commitments, or corporate sustainability agendas.
Most of the world has never heard of the Chin Hills or its rich bio-
diversity and unique ecosystems: locally famous oak-
rhododendron forests harboring endemic birds, a ‘‘sky island” of
Himalayan alpine flora, and highly threatened medicinal orchids
(United Nations Educational, 2020). Chin State’s Natma Taung
National Park belongs to the Eastern Himalayas Endemic Bird Area
(United Nations Educational, 2020), the entire state falls within the
Indo-Burma Biodiversity Hotspot, and most of Myanmar’s forest
types are either ‘‘vulnerable” or face ‘‘an extremely high risk of
extinction” (International Finance Corporation, 2017: 4). There
are, therefore, good grounds for expanding the country’s protected
area system – including in Chin State, where the Chin Hills-Arakan
Yoma montane forests have remained relatively intact
(International Finance Corporation, 2017).
Myanmar has, however, a fresh history of state-sanctioned
‘‘green grabbing”. In Tanintharyi Region, resentment has been
voiced about ‘‘various forest mapping, land rezoning, and liveli-
hood interventions” carried out without endorsement from local
Karen National Union leaders (Woods, 2019: 47). In Chin State,
plans are ripening for five new national parks (Aung, 2020).
Although government authorities have taken note of locals’ depen-
dence on resources in Chin protected areas (Aung, Adam, Pretzsch,
& Peters, 2015; Aung, 2020), there are warning signals not to be
overlooked: residents of Chuncung village near Mt. Zinghmuh have
complained about state neglect in addressing their concerns about
dam construction in a sacred religious and water-source area. An
envisioned ecotourism business near Nat Ma Taung National Park,
in turn, stalled in 2017 as locals denounced plans to establish a
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2017). These cases exemplify that local people in Chin State
already endure acts of neglect in the name of conservation. Time
has yet to show if these troubling dynamics will abate or gain trac-
tion, as international conservation actors gain interest in the
region’s natural bounty and tourism takes off – or so state actors
hoped.64.3. Comparative assessment: Four phases of neglect in resource
frontiers
On opposite sides of the globe, the Chin Hills and Matopiba have
experienced similar frontier dynamics. Places long forsaken by the
outside world have rapidly gained attention and attracted multiple
interests. While Matopiba is a classic ‘‘boom crop” expansion case,
Chin State might be considered a more diverse frontier (though
with clear signs of dispossession risks building up). Despite their
differences, however, neglect appears to be a constitutive element
of both of these resource frontiers.
As we contrast our cases, the emergent pattern is that neglect
goes through at least four distinct phases in resource frontiers:
pre-frontier abandonment, selective support, overlooked harms,
and biased sustainability agendas (see Table 1).
Our first key observation is that neglect paves the way for
impoverishment and dispossession throughout, not only before
the establishment of resource frontiers. To be sure, pre-frontier
abandonment is perhaps the most intuitive and easily identifiable
phase of neglect. Communities in Matopiba and the Chin Hills were
politically marginalized and impoverished before history took a
turn and state actors gained interest in the commodification poten-
tial of these hitherto disregarded regions.
However, once those places caught outsiders’ attention and
frontier dynamics took hold, neglect merely entered its second
phase. Continued but more blatant abandonment of local people
by public or private outside actors, who could assist them but forgo
this possibility in favor of selective support for outsiders, is charac-
teristic during this phase. Neglectful actors seemingly add insult to
injury when they finally start to come but not to assist – or finally
read – communities, although they could. Rather, the state and
others materially or institutionally assist only or primarily outside
entrepreneurs, while continuing to mostly ignore local needs and
aspirations, through preferential land tenure provision to entrepre-
neurs, biased research and development that does not meet long
standing needs, or economic support to colonists but not to locals.
There can be conviviality (however regretful) between locals and
newcomers during this phase; forms of natural resource ‘‘grab-
bing”, and local conflicts might emerge, but this may not yet be a
characteristic feature of the overall frontier. What communities
resent in this frontier phase is heightened neglect and a more obvi-
ous lack of inclusiveness, perhaps tinted with a clearer sense of dis-
crimination (see also Li, 2014b; Bastos Lima & Persson, 2020).
Neglect enters the third phase when communities start to be
substantially harmed by extractive activities and no one – or too
few – read their grievances. Locals may be left without access to
safe drinking water or customarily used land, have their environ-
ment poisoned by chemicals, and many times become targeted
by symbolic and physical violence. Our analysis shows that such
dynamics have long been a bleak everyday reality for Matopiba’s6 The military coup on the first of February 2021, has severely disrupted Myanmar’s
tourism industry, public service provision and people’s economic and everyday lives
at large. The Tatmadaw forces have killed hundreds of people, and thousands have
been detained. Clashes between military troops and armed resistance movements
have taken place in Kalay and various Chin towns throughout 2021. Chin State
remains a likely tourism frontier in the long run, but local people’s immediate future
is now more uncertain than it has been for years.
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communities and now begin to loom on the Chin Hills’ horizon.
Yet, there is usually little heeding to such issues. Resource frontiers
are notoriously dangerous places, and while much is said of those
who venture out into such ‘‘remote” areas (see Harms et al., 2014),
most dangers seem to be experienced by local communities them-
selves. It might be hard to accurately distinguish this phase from
the previous one – it is an escalation, and an exact threshold could
be arbitrary – yet it is important to recognize this additional form
of neglect. The ‘‘subtle optimism” said to underscore the feeling of
neglect (Taylor, 2018) likely suffers a harder blow, albeit not nec-
essarily fatal, when the one(s) from whom attention is expected
fail to listen even in the face of dispossession and violence.
Finally, the fourth phase of neglect is distinguishable when
environmental concern about frontier developments (e.g., biodi-
versity loss, greenhouse gas emissions from land-use change)
attracts outsider attention but, despite talk of sustainability, local
people’s interests fail to be read once again. Here, neglect may arise
from state agencies or incoming resource users as much as from
civil society organizations that make themselves present and prob-
lematize a resource frontier. As Kingdon (1995) states, a situation
is only treated as a problem when it is successfully framed as
one. However, due to the dominance of biophysical concerns in
mainstream environmentalism (Martínez-Alier, 2002), it has
become common for communities to be continually ignored, even
by those who pose themselves against resource extraction. In
Matopiba, as is often the case for agricultural commodity frontiers,
consumer concerns and readings of sustainability have gained far
more attention than local people’s views (Bastos Lima & Persson,
2020). The latter are thus once again neglected, in ever novel ways.
These four phases of neglect, perceptible from our comparative
assessment, can serve as a heuristic framework to understand
neglect’s shifting roles and manifestations in resource frontiers
(Fig. 3). Although we argue that frontier neglect typically evolves
in such a four-phase sequence, empirical realities may depart from
this stylized conception. Most notably, as the Chin case illustrates,
pre-frontier abandonment may move straight to conservation or
tourism-oriented dispossession (see also Neef, 2021). In other
words, the creation of novel environmental commodities can cause
neglect to leap from Phase I to IV in places that have not been cov-
eted as classical commodity frontiers. That growing drive arguably
arises out of heightened international environmental concerns,
with an increased sense of looming scarcity of pristine ecosystems
or ‘‘nature” (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015), in part due to classical fron-
tierization and commodity-driven deforestation elsewhere.5. Discussion
5.1. The roles of imaginative, economic, and political neglect
Neglect is an easily grasped concept. Still, the exact ways it
operates are worth dissecting, not the least for thinking about
how to address it. We identify at least three domains where
neglect plays a critical role in frontier assemblages: imaginative,
economic, and political (Table 2). In conjunction, they are funda-
mental for ‘‘obscuring” and stunting bottom-up competing alterna-
tives while advancing dominant interests and agendas across
different stages of frontierization (see McCarthy & Cramb, 2009).
First, as the Chin and Matopiba cases illustrate, imagining any
region as a place of ‘‘not yet” – as Tsing (2003: 5100) characterizes
resource frontiers – is only viable through neglecting what there is.
Imaginations of ‘‘unpeopled wilderness, pregnant with possibility”
(Cons & Eilenberg, 2019: 8) often are rather ‘‘de-peopled” places,
from where inhabitants are not only concretely but also imagina-
tively expelled. Not rarely, under racist or culturalist discrimina-
tion, they either are regarded as people who do not count or
Table 1
Phases and forms of neglect in Brazil and Myanmar.




Communities have wished for but lacked access to healthcare, education and
employment opportunities, technical assistance and rural extension services
targeted to smallholder farming, transport and communications
infrastructure, and land tenure security.
Communities wish for but lack basic amenities and services
including: secure drinking water, year-round electricity, affordable
and physically accessible healthcare, education, vocational training
and employment opportunities, extension programmes, irrigation,




Transport infrastructure being built by the state for soy cargos; public credit
and state-funded research and extension favoring large agribusiness while
neglecting smallholder agriculture, despite the latter’s well-known
importance for local and national food security.
Upgrades of major and secondary roads and bridges are underway,
and Chin State’s first airport just opened. Investors benefit from
corporate income tax exemptions for up to seven years. Authorities
provide land in support of an emerging tourism sector and
showcase regional investment opportunities. Land-sector laws
enable appropriation of allegedly vacant land, while neglect of basic





Smallholders and traditional communities evicted from their customary
lands, often with ‘‘legal” blessing from the state due to lack of tenure security
the state itself failed to provide earlier.
Complaints about restricted or compromised access to water and other
customarily used natural resources go unheeded. Public authorities and
private investors ignore local grievances about widespread pesticide
contamination in communities near soy farms, as well as (often not
investigated) cases of physical abuse, death threats and murder.
Rural households are at risk of losing control over customary land,
facilitated by Myanmar’s Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land
Management Law.
Local inequalities grow and communities lack support vis-a-vis




Growing global concern about conservation of Cerrado vegetation appears to
regard only biodiversity and carbon stocks. View of Matopiba as a zero-sum
game between only soy and native vegetation. Local communities and their
views are excluded from the landscape governance agenda, even around
sustainability concerns. Neglect towards alternative, inclusive development
visions grassroots organizations have long espoused for the region.
International tourist flocks and conservation actors have yet to take
full note of Chin State’s natural bounty. Neglect through exclusive
conservation-based activities in the hand of state authorities and
private investors has already sprung, however.
Fig. 3. The four phases of neglect in resource frontiers. Neglect in resource frontiers typically goes through a sequence of four phases (black arrows). Yet, in line with
heightened global environmental concerns, ‘‘green grabbing” increasingly leads neglect dynamics in resource frontiers to leap directly from Phase I to Phase IV (striped green
arrow). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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assimilated or make way (Russo Lopes & Bastos Lima, 2020). The
frontier-making of Brazil’s Cerrado, while highlighting agricultural
expansion and its potentials for increased food production and for
bringing ‘‘development” to an ‘‘empty” place, has counted crucially
on the imaginative neglect over pre-existing communities, local
aspirations, and forms of social organization. Chin communities’10subsistence-oriented farming practices and deep-rooted cultural
ties to the land are likewise relegated in maps and legal frame-
works, which localize Myanmar’s greatest relative share of vacant,
fallow, or virgin land in their state.
Second, economic neglect, too, often underscores the material
poverty that makes resource frontiers possible and, later, serves
to legitimize their creation. We concur with Erni (2015: 4) that
Table 2




Neglect of life-worlds, politico-economic
arrangements and socio-ecological
relations in a given place.
Markets, investors, and state authorities fail
to support local economic development. No
attention to community aspirations, unmet
needs (e.g., food insecurity), etc.
Exclusion from political processes or legal
ordering (e.g., tenure insecurity and no
recognition for customary institutions or
access rights).
Phase II: Selective support Articulation of the frontier as a ‘‘place of
not yet”, with the invisibilization of local
actors and their traditional economic
activities or forms of organization.
Investments, public credit and market
access created for commodity chains and
outsider enterprises, paired with
continuous – but now more blatant –
neglect of people’s needs and wants.
Discrimination becomes more evident.
Selective political and governmental
support for outsiders, coupled with
discriminatory legal practices and
obstructed institutional access for local
actors.
Phase III: Overlooked harms Under a façade of progress and newly
created businesses, markets, institutions
and political orderings, there is
perpetuated ignorance of and disregard for
local people’s altered or permanently
destroyed life-worlds. Local worldviews
and ways of life are violently eclipsed in
silence.
No attention to hampered or destroyed
local economic activities, or to undermined
alternative development paths, as the focus
is on the new, emerging forms of resource
use.
Unresponsiveness towards local grievances
and dispossession as resource
commodification and large-scale resource
appropriation gather pace. Lack of
accountability for land and water grabbing




Local socio-ecological relations, political
priorities and economic aspirations remain
overlooked, and local communities are
sidelined, as conservation actors following
international sustainability agendas and –
at times – ecotourism enterprises gain a
foothold.
Predominance of sustainability agendas
that privilege wealthier actors,
commodified conservation, and
international market mechanisms and
integration, over bottom-up conservation
initiatives, resource stewardship and local
development priorities.
Exclusion of local and other critical
stakeholders (including the ones most
exposed to environmental change) from
sustainability initiatives and landscape-
scale governance arrangements.
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much poor as ‘‘impoverished” by forces beyond their control. In
both Brazil and Myanmar, we see that calls for improved infras-
tructure and locally relevant extension services – let alone credit
or market access – have long been neglected until the arrival of
outside interests, frequently associated with dispossession. Many
locals also lack knowledge and tools (e.g., monitoring capacity,
their own inscription devices, protection mechanisms) to defend
their land against intruders (see Brofeldt et al., 2018). Such impov-
erishment makes local dwellers easy prey to top-down formal land
zoning and purchase offers. It leaves them with little ability to pro-
mote alternative economic development paths, and in turn serves
to legitimize the creation of resource frontiers as beneficial acts.
Public or private actors can then comfortably argue they do a favor
to regions that ‘‘produced nothing” and where ‘‘vacant land” is in
ample supply (see Woodworth, 2017 for a relatable example on
China and Inner Mongolia.).
Third, political neglect underscores the all-too-common legal
vulnerability of local people at resource frontiers and their exclu-
sion from landscape governance or land-use planning. Without
tenure security or proper access to state institutions, villagers in
Matopiba and Chin have been exposed to and threatened by legal
or illegal dispossession, including outright eviction. Meanwhile,
development plans or sustainability agendas are being made –
sometimes allegedly to local peoples’ benefit – without duly con-
sidering their livelihoods or taking their views and preferences into
account. Traditionally, frontier studies focus on the state as the pri-
mary agent behind pushes to enclose outliers or conquer new
spaces. However, in contemporary economies the state arguably
acts as an accomplice, a facilitator, an aide that creates legal, polit-
ical, and sometimes material infrastructures to attract transna-
tional capital while persistently ignoring the needs and wants of
local people (Jessop, 1990). As a result, the state ‘‘offers[s] unequal
chances to different forces”; it privileges certain interests while
disregarding others, and both actions need attention (Jessop,
1990: 367).11Neglect is, in this regard, akin to the dark side of the moon, a
half which is constitutive of the whole but typically remains
unseen (see Fig. 4). Light is usually shed only onto the visible half
of resource frontiers, on investors’ actions, what the state puts in
place in terms of incentives, regulations, or international market
demands and finance. Yet, as seen, neglect towards local commu-
nities may be just as critical for resource frontiers to emerge and
evolve. While enabling certain actions through their presence,
the state and private actors often simultaneously disenfranchise
locals through their absence. Among others, such neglect is also
chiefly responsible for the typical lack of accountability in resource
frontiers (see Bastos Lima et al., 2021; Cons & Eilenberg, 2019).
5.2. Responding to neglect: Legitimizing narratives as Achilles’ heels of
dispossession dynamics
Three grand justifications have come to the fore as legitimizing
rationales with which public and private forces create frontier
environments conducive to dispossession: development, global
food security, and environmental conservation. Neglect operates
as an unseen flipside in all of these cases and, if exposed, appears
as a contradiction — or the Achilles’ heel — of grand narratives that
thus suddenly become incoherent.
Development, perhaps the most common rationale for frontier
making, serves as an almost altruistic framing that dates at least
as far back as the classical ‘‘white man’s burden”. Often conflated
with economic growth, the narrative of bringing development to
frontier spaces only works because it is banally used, without
regard to inclusiveness (Russo Lopes et al., 2021). What is pro-
moted through frontier making becomes seen as the only alterna-
tive to stasis and persistent abandonment — something feasible so
long as alternatives remain silenced or cripplingly undermined. As
we have seen, local agency is usually overlooked and disenfran-
chised in such settings, as there is a need for making grievances
or alternatives invisible. To some extent, community organization,
networking and collective resistance can therefore counter invisi-
Fig. 4. Three dimensions of neglect as the often-unseen flipside of frontier assemblages.
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insider identities” has been witnessed in Matopiba (e.g., with
Afro-Brazilian communities), that is, growing self-recognition as
holding (more) legitimate rights to the land vis-a-vis outsiders. If
neglect has a subjective dimension and indeed betrays a feeling
of non-sovereignty from the part of the neglected (Taylor, 2018),
bottom-up initiatives may also help overcome that self-
perception besides making local actors more visible to the outside
world.
The neo-Malthusian narrative of ‘‘feeding the world”, too,
increasingly offers a convenient reason for pushes at frontiers
(see De Schutter, 2017). A political project thus unduly gains the
legitimacy that ‘‘emergency” responses afford (Lund, 2019: 22),
akin to the way even climate change prospects may be used to jus-
tify atrocities (Paprocki, 2019). The Matopiba case demonstrates
how powerful such policy discourses are in imaginatively refram-
ing places of systemic violence into virtuous breadbaskets, while
locals’ very own food access needs may be neglected (see also
Ito, Rachman, & Savitri, 2014). Nevertheless, such narratives can
be challenged, as exemplified by a growing body of research into
the local dietary impacts of landscape transformations (Ickowitz,
Powell, Rasmussen, & Rhemtulla, 2021).
Finally, outsiders often reframe community territories as
untouched places of precious natural bounty, not to be cleared or
converted but conserved for ecosystem service payments or tour-
ism (Neef, 2021). Chin State is but one example of where such
dynamics may unfold with force. Critical to the effectiveness of
such a mainstream narrative is to disregard convivial forms of con-
servation — often enmeshed in pre-existing traditions and liveli-
hoods – as an alternative. Research that unmasks the framing of
places simply as vanishing wilderness can, therefore, be a useful
tool to analyze outsiders’ imaginative neglect and how inclusive
their sustainability agendas truly are.
Myth-busting these powerful but self-contradictory narratives
can help to challenge fallacious frontier imaginations. Still, out-
sider support to local initiatives and resistance movements may
be required to overcome deeply ingrained dimensions of economic
and political neglect. Not only do private investors and state actors
need to be held accountable for their destructive actions in
resource frontiers, but inclusive, bottom-up development alterna-
tives are also critical. It is vital to overcome neglect over the pleas12and grievances of local actors as well as over their agency and
potential protagonism.
6. Conclusion
As last frontier politics gain traction and hasten the pace of
resource capture worldwide, analyses of their dynamics and legit-
imacy become all the more important. This article concurs that
there usually are enabling conditions for a process of dispossession
in resource frontiers. We articulate how frontiers are spaces of
flows as well as spaces of marginalization. In assessing frontier
assemblages in Brazil and Myanmar, we show that while neglect
might not be the process of change itself, it paves the way for dis-
possession and exclusion. If music is not only in the notes but also
the silence between them, the making of frontiers, too, resides in
actions as much as in neglect.
Our conclusions around the importance of neglect for under-
standing resource frontiers are three-fold. First, neglect is co-
constitutive of frontier dynamics and works throughout them in
various phases. Neglect does not disappear with the emergence
of outside interest but gains new facets, such as when sustainabil-
ity agendas disregard local peoples’ views. Imagining places ‘‘preg-
nant with possibility” requires neglecting what is already there,
while material impoverishment and political exclusion leave local
people vulnerable to dispossession and facilitates that territories
be ‘‘de-peopled” both in a figurative and in a physical sense.
Second, although calls for greater responsiveness, public
accountability and legal obligations toward local communities
usually focus on the state, non-state actors are often neglectful,
too. In our cases, communities especially resent being neglected
by their governments but not only. They also feel neglected by
markets, investors, and environmental NGOs. Public and private
actors have framed these ‘‘last frontiers” as final spaces for
resource use or protection, legitimized with narratives of develop-
ment, global food security, or nature conservation.
Third, there are important multi-level interactions regarding
frontiers that deserve further research. Given a growing perception
of relatively little uncommodified land and nature left on the globe
and planetary boundaries being crossed, individual frontiers have
experienced growing pressure in the name of conservation. For
the first time in history, global land dynamics may be reaching
M.G. Bastos Lima and L. Kmoch World Development 148 (2021) 105681what Phase IV of the neglect framework depicts for specific fron-
tiers, where perceptions of scarcity lead to exclusive conservation.
This phenomenon raises not only questions about the workings of
neglect in resource frontiers but also on global decision-making
arenas negotiating trade-offs between conservation and develop-
ment objectives.
Lastly, we critique the common self-reliance bias that leads
some outsiders to a priori regard local communities as necessarily
better off alone, and external engagement mostly as suspiciously
maleficial. While likely accurate in certain contexts, our cases show
that this assumption cannot be generalized. Communities do not
always reject the state-space in favor of autonomy. On the con-
trary, they may rather welcome it if this improves their livelihoods
and affords them access to desired services. Therefore, the question
is not whether or not to engage, but who should do so, how, and
when.
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